Learn the Difference Between Culpable Homicide and Murder

MURDER AND CULPABLE HOMICIDE

CULPABLE HOMICIDE

1. Whoever causes death: the offence is complete as soon as any person is killed i.e. it is immaterial that if the person whom the accused intended to kill was not killed but some other person was killed. The death must be the proximate result and not a remote consequence of the violence i.e. the act must be causa causans and not merely causa sine qua non. If death is caused by words deliberately used by a person with the intention or knowledge of causing that result, the person shall be liable for culpable homicide.
2. An act done with the intention to cause death: intention does not assume the existence of some previous design, it means an actual intention, the existing intention of the moment and it is proved by the accused and the circumstances of the case. Everyone must be presumed to intend the normal consequences of his act. In determining the question of intention the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body on which the blow was given, the force and number of blows shall be taken into consideration.
3. The intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death: if a person did not intend to cause death but he had an intention to cause such bodily injury which is sufficient to cause death in its consequence then also the person shall be liable for the culpable homicide.
4. The knowledge that such act is likely to cause death: knowledge is the awareness of the consequences of an act. A person who voluntarily inflicts injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death i.e. death will be the most probable result shall be liable for culpable homicide. A rash act by which death is caused imports knowledge of the likelihood of causing death.

MURDER

1. If the act by which the death is caused is done to cause death with the intention of causing death. In determining the question of intention the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body on which the blow was given, the force and number of blows shall be taken into consideration.

1. With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death: there is an intention to cause particular injury which turns out to be likely to cause death i.e. the intention of the accused was to cause such bodily injury which he knew is likely to cause death. The death could be the probable result of the injury caused.
2. With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be in­flicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death: there was an intention on the part of accused to inflict the particular injury found on the body of the victim and in the light of medical evidence such injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The accused need not have knowledge as to whether the injury intended to cause would have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Once the intention to cause such bodily injury is proved which is subjective to the offender then rest of the enquiry is purely objective in reference of medical evidence as to whether the injury intended to cause would have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
3. Imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death: an imminently dangerous act is done in general and the person committing such act knows that it is likely to cause death. The knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability.

• Grave and sudden provocation which would deprive any reasonable man of his power of self-control. Also, there must not be sufficient time for the passion caused by the provocation to cool down. When the provocation is provided from the side of the accused himself, he cannot claim any benefit of this exception.
• The excessive exercise of the right of private defence provided the accused caused the death of the accused without premeditation and had no intention of doing more harm than was necessary for the purpose of defence. The right commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger arises and ceases when the apprehension ceased.
• If the person accused is a public servant and in good faith, he commits an act which was lawful and necessary to discharge his duties. The public servant should not have any ill-will against the deceased.
• An act committed in a sudden fight in the heat of passion provided that the offender did not take any undue advantage nor acted in a cruel manner. Also, it is immaterial which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. There has to be a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged wherein there is no time for passion to cool down.