Passage-Based Questions on Legal Reasoning for CLAT UG [Part 15]
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Adtiya Aryan6 min readPassage 1 (P.1)
In the aftermath of rapid industrial expansion, courts were confronted with an unsettling question: could enterprises engaged in inherently hazardous activities be permitted to externalize catastrophic risk onto surrounding communities under the protective umbrella of traditional tort doctrines? The controversy crystallized when a toxic gas leak from a large industrial plant caused widespread harm to residents living in its proximity. The enterprise argued that liability, if any, must be tested against the classical English rule in strict liability, which recognized certain exceptions such as act of God, third-party intervention, or plaintiff’s own fault. The Court, however, observed that doctrines evolved in 19th-century England were ill-suited to densely populated industrial societies. The magnitude of potential harm, the asymmetry of knowledge between enterprise and victim, and the economic capacity of industrial entities demanded a doctrinal recalibration. It was held that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results from an accident in the course of such activity, the enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate all those affected. Unlike strict liability, this rule admitted no exceptions. The reasoning rested on constitutional foundations. The right to life was interpreted not merely as animal existence but as the right to live with human dignity, free from avoidable environmental hazards. The Court further reasoned that enterprises deriving profit from dangerous activities must bear the social cost of accidents as an integral part of their operational expense. To permit exceptions would dilute deterrence and undermine distributive justice. Importantly, the Court linked liability to enterprise capacity. Compensation was not to be symbolic; it had to be commensurate with the financial strength of the offending entity so as to serve both compensatory and deterrent functions. The principle was framed as an indigenous constitutional innovation, not a borrowed common-law transplant. The judgment marked a decisive shift from fault-based reasoning to enterprise accountability embedded within constitutional morality.

